Profit sharing and the quality of relations with the boss by Green, C & Heywood, J S
Labour Economics 17 (2010) 859–867
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Labour Economics
j ourna l homepage: www.e lsev ie r.com/ locate / l abecoProfit sharing and the quality of relations with the boss
Colin P. Green a,⁎, John S. Heywood b,c
a Department of Economics, Lancaster University, Lancaster, LA1 4YX, UK
b Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI 53201, USA
c School of Business, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT UK⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: c.p.green@lancaster.ac.uk (C.P. Gre
(J.S. Heywood).
0927-5371/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier B.V. Al
doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2010.04.004a b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Received 23 September 2009
Received in revised form 4 April 2010
Accepted 7 April 2010









Profit sharesProfit sharing generates conflicting changes in the relationship between supervisors andworkers. Itmay increase
cooperation and helping effort. At the same time it can increase directmonitoring and pressure by the supervisor,
and mutual monitoring and peer pressure from other workers that is transmitted through the supervisor. Using
UK data on satisfaction with the boss, we show in both cross-section and panel estimates that workers under
profit sharing tend to have lower satisfactionwith their supervisor. This result persists even as profit sharing has
no or a positive influence on other dimensions of job satisfaction. Additional estimates show that lower
satisfactionwith the supervisor is largely generated bywomen,whomay be less able to respond to peer pressure,
and by non-union workers, who may have more to lose by failing to respond to peer pressure.en), Heywood@uwm.edu
l rights reserved.© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Profit sharing has been identified with a range of positive economic
outcomes including increased firm productivity, innovation and profits,
reduced worker turnover and increased worker training (Kruse, 1992;
Bhargava, 1994; Azfar and Danninger, 2001; Green and Heywood,
forthcoming-a; Harden et al., 2008). Most of these outcomes have at
their base theoretical conjectures about how profit sharing changes the
relationships between co-workers and between workers and the firm.
Without these changes, the potential for increased worker effort and
productivity remains limited by the strong incentive for free-riding. One
view of these changes claims that profit sharing increases cooperation
between colleagues and between workers and management in a
repeated game (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990, McNabb and Whitfield,
1998; Pendelton, 2006). An alternative view emphasizes that profit
sharing generates mutual monitoring and peer pressure (Kandel and
Lazear, 1992; Freeman et al., 2010). The role of the supervisor emerges as
key in this second view. Profit sharing enhances both the ability and theincentive for supervisors to monitor and punish workers in order to
reduce shirking (Heywood et al., 2005b). Moreover, much of themutual
monitoring between co-workers takes place through the reporting of
shirking to supervisors (Freeman et al., 2010). In this second view,while
profit sharing may change relationships between supervisors and
workers to increase effort, the resulting increase in monitoring may
nonetheless decrease workers' utility or, at the minimum, worsen
relationships with the supervisor.
We use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to examine
the influence of whether or not an individual worker receives profit
sharing on his or her relationship with the supervisor or boss. While
recognizing that profit sharing has many aspects and may influence
overall workers' utility, we are interested in the utility flowing from
this relationship. Thus, we focus on a specific measure of how
satisfied workers are with their immediate boss. We confirm that
individual workers receiving profit sharing report lower satisfaction
with the boss than do workers not receiving profit sharing.
Moreover, workers receiving profit sharing report less emphasis
on the importance of getting along with their boss and greater stress
at work. Yet, this deterioration in relations with the supervisor does
not reflect a diminution in overall job satisfaction and is specific to
the relationship with the boss. Profit sharing has a neutral or
positive influence on all of the other available dimensions of job
satisfaction over the time period investigated. Moreover, the
negative influence of profit sharing on relations with the boss
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satisfaction and when exploiting the panel data to control for sorting
and worker specific fixed effects.
We also identify strong patterns within the general finding.
Estimating the equation separately by gender reveals that women
disproportionately generate the negative relationship between profit
sharing and relations with the supervisor. This difference confirms
earlier cross-sectional estimates in Germany and is consistent with the
contention that women may be less able to respond to peer pressure
because of greater commitments outside of work. Unionisation also
plays a key role. While profit sharing is associated with poorer relations
with supervisors for non-union members, it is actually associated with
improved relations for unionmembers. As we discuss, unionsmay limit
the ability of the boss to pressure workers or may be instrumental in
creating successful profit sharing agreements.
The finding that profit sharing diminishes satisfaction with the
supervisor supports the view that profit sharing increases the incentive
for monitoring by the supervisor and for mutual monitoring that likely
involves the supervisor. Apart from thismajor implication, the evidence
on satisfaction with the boss is of interest in its own right as the
industrial psychology literature has long seen it as particularly
important in predicting worker productivity (Yammarino and
Dubinsky, 1987) and turnover (DeConninck, 2009). Among economists
Clark (2001) finds a significant role for satisfaction with the supervisor
in predicting turnover but one that does not persist when seven other
facets of satisfaction are entered. Delfgauuw (2007) finds that low
satisfaction with management plays a significant role in workers'
decisions to search for a job outside the current organization even given
many other facets of satisfaction while Cornellissen (2009) links the
quality of relations with supervisors to both job search and eventual
turnover.
In what follows, the next section isolates the potential contra-
dictory influences of profit sharing on relations with co-workers
and, in more detail, with the boss. The third section introduces our
data and methodology while the fourth section presents the critical
estimations. A final section concludes and makes suggestions for
further research.
2. Profit sharing and supervisory pressure
At its core profit sharing seeks to alleviate agency problems by
more closely aligning worker and firm interests. For instance, in a
survey of US firms, Kruse (1993) reports that the most prevalent
reason given by managers for providing profit sharing is to motivate
workers. Yet, profit sharing remains potentially problematic as the
limited liability constraint (rewarding workers for firm profits but
not punishing them for losses) can encourage strategies that
increase profit in the short term at the cost of lower overall
performance (Oyer, 2000). More generally, the alignment of interest
may simply not motivate workers as each worker faces an incentive
to free-ride on the effort of others. Except in the case of strong
production complementarities between workers (Adams, 2006),
individual workers recognize that only 1/N of their productivity
increase will be returned to them through profit sharing and will
under supply effort.1 Yet, this simple conclusion fails to recognize
that profit sharing creates an incentive for each worker to influence
the productivity of their co-workers. This incentive can change
group norms. On the one hand, it can encourage increased
cooperation and helping on-the-job (see the evidence presented
by Drago and Garvey, 1998). On the other hand, it also encourages
mutual monitoring and peer pressure to reduce shirking (Kandel1 An example of such complementarities would be “weakest-link” technology in
which the productivity of the least productive worker determines the productivity of
the workplace.and Lazear, 1992). While both of these may increase productivity,
they can have very different influences on worker utility.2
At first thought both helping on-the-job and mutual monitoring
represent workers taking on responsibilities previously done only by
managers. Certainly thebasicmanagerial functionofmonitoring effort is
replaced, in part, by horizontal monitoring by co-workers. Workers are
often in a better position than managers to monitor effort. As workers
conduct their activities, they gain knowledge about the productivity of
their co-workers and profit sharing creates an incentive to act on this
knowledge. Much of the emphasis in the literature is on the creation of
peer pressure. Kandel and Lazear (1992) discuss examples including
internalpressure byguilt andexternalpressure byshame,ostracismand
even physical punishment when a worker is caught shirking by his co-
workers. The case study of Continental Airlines by Knez and Simester
(2001) identify both a high incidence of mutual monitoring of absence
andof peer pressure inducedby the company's profit sharingplan.More
generally, survey data used by Freeman et al. (2010) reveal that most
workers can detect shirking among co-workers and that profit sharing
(group incentive) schemes are associated with a significantly larger
likelihood of taking action against those shirking.
Less explicit in this story of horizontal monitoring and enforcement
is the important role of the supervisor. The survey data make clear that
the most likely response to observing shirking is to report it to the
supervisor (Freeman et al., 2010). Profit sharing creates an incentive to
provide information to supervisors that would otherwise be absent or
only available at higher cost. Moreover, not only does the supervisor
have better information on worker shirking because of profit sharing,
she also has an increased incentive to use this information by putting
pressure on shirkers to perform. This incentive is at least two-fold. First,
the workers themselves have an incentive to pressure the supervisor to
deal with shirkers. Thus, the label ‘horizontal monitoring’ does not
necessarily mean that the resulting pressure on those shirking comes
directly from co-workers. Second, most profit sharing arrangements
include the immediate supervisor who, as a consequence, has a large
financial incentive to pressure shirkers. Indeed, the unique tools of a
supervisory position suggest that the effectiveness of suchpressuremay
be particularly effective. For instance, Freeman et al. (2010) show an
increased willingness to act against shirkers in order to raise group
earnings as one gets higher in the firm hierarchy.
Thus, profit sharing should be anticipated to result in increased
monitoring and pressure from the boss. This reflects the improved
information and pressure provided by horizontal monitoring
(through the interaction of the workers with the boss) and the
increased financial incentive for the boss to pressure shirkers. With
this anticipation, a critical point is that made by Kandel and Lazear
(1992, p. 805): “While pressure guarantees higher effort, it does not
guarantee higher utility because the pressure itself is borne by all
members of the firm.” Barron and Gjerde (1997) go further arguing
that some firmsmay reduce the intensity of profit sharing or eliminate
it altogether because the disutility imposed by monitoring and peer
pressure violates the participation constraint. In essence, the
individually rational worker engages in too much peer pressure
because the disutility that his or her peer pressure imposes on others
is not internalised. As much of this pressure may be channelled
through the supervisor, profit sharing may cause workers to dislike or
resent their supervisor even as it causes them to exert more effort.
Moreover, even as profit sharing increases effort, the increased
monitoring and pressure may crowd-out cooperation and trust within
thefirm (Orr, 2001). In this viewprofit sharing creates a ‘suspicion effect’
in which workers suspect that co-workers and the boss provide effort
and help not for intrinsic reasons but simply to avoid monitoring and2 Such changes in norms need not always increase profit. Workers may value
helping for its own sake and help “too much” or they may punish shirkers through
sabotage or other counterproductive methods.
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relationships with their boss.
We recognize that profit sharing changes many dimensions of
employmentand certainlydonot suggest theywill all benegative. Again,
the net influence of profit sharing may be to increase utility but our
primary interest is the utility derived from the relationship between
workers and their boss. Even here profit sharing may have positive
influences. Drago and Turnbull (1988) demonstrate that profit sharing
provides incentives for helping on-the-job since each worker's income
depends, in part, on the output of co-workers. Indeed, empiricalwork by
Drago and Garvey (1998) shows an increased willingness of workers to
share tools under profit sharing. Moreover, Rotenberg (1994) empha-
sises the close connection between such cooperation and the utility one
gets from interacting with co-workers. Bandiera et al. (2005) add the
element of social relations within the workplace showing evidence that
workers are more likely to internalize externalities associated with
incentive schemeswhen theyworkwith close friends. Similar reasoning
applies to relationswith the supervisors. Profit sharingmay lead tomore
helping ofworkers by the supervisor, improved relationships andhigher
utility. In this view cooperation may be beneficial and add to utility
regardless of the motivation.
Profit sharing may also influence how fairly supervisors treat
workers. Prendergast and Topel (1993) argue that favouritism is more
likely when supervisors are not the residual claimants of workers'
outputs. Laffont (1990) shows that the supervisor's incentive to engage
in hidden gaming and favouritism is reduced if the supervisor receives a
profit share. These results follow from the observation that if a
supervisor's remuneration is dependent onworker output this increases
the cost of ‘incorrectly’ rewarding relatively poor performing subordi-
nates. Certainly, empirical work by Bandiera et al. (2009) show that
when supervisors are paid fixed wages, they favour those subordinates
who are friends. Performance bonuses (including perhaps those tied to
profit sharing) are shown to reduce such favouritism. Insofar as
favouritism and other unfair treatment increases conflict, it would be
expected that profit sharing should increase worker satisfaction with
their superiors.
Overall, theory provides an ambiguous answer to how profit sharing
should influence the satisfaction of workers with their supervisors. The
few studies that have directly examined this provide little consensus
either. As part of a more general study of the relationship between job
satisfaction and performance pay, Heywood and Wei (2006) present a
single specification for theyear1988 from theNLSY. Theyfind that profit
sharing is associated with a small and weakly significant increase in
satisfaction with the supervisor. Importantly, this cross-sectional
increase appears as part of a broader relationship in which those in
profit sharing tend to have higher overall satisfaction as well. Heywood
et al. (2005b) examine a single year of the GSOEP, 1995, that asks about
the degree of conflict with the boss. Profit sharing reduced the degree of
conflict for male workers who were in good health and had no
supervisory responsibilities. For others, the influence was often absent
or even negative. Kruse et al. (2010) probe individual elements of work
life showing that “shared capitalism” is associated with worker
perceptions of being treated with respect, of promotions being handled
fairly and of management–employee relations being good. Profit
sharing, in particular, is strongly associated with perceptions that the
company is fair to employees. Yet, the link between overall job
satisfaction and profit sharing emerged as insignificant in one data
source and as having offsetting influences in the second data source.3
Thismaynot be surprising as in their reviewof 12 studies examining the
influence of various forms of employee ownership on job satisfaction,
Kruse et al. (2010 p. 7) conclude that there exists “no clear
generalization.” In short, the issuedeserves additional empirical inquiry.3 Thus, Kruse et al. (2010) use their NBER data to show that profit sharing provision
is associated with lower job satisfaction even as the share of earnings derived from
profit sharing is associated with higher job satisfaction.2.1. Moderating influences
Workers differ in their ability to increase their effort and productivity
in response to incentives. This point becomes critical in thinking about
the behaviour of supervisors under profit sharing. Workers who are less
able to increase their effort as a result of increased pressure may find
themselves singled out by co-workers and supervisors. In our estima-
tions, we focus on a number of specific groups for whom it may be
expected that this could be true. Thus, in addition to asking the general
question of whether or not profit sharing influences the job satisfaction
associated with the supervisor, we examine circumstances in which a
negative influence might be particularly likely.
Women may demand greater flexibility between work and home
due to greater responsibility of household production. This leads them
to be sorted (or sort) into jobs with lesser degrees of interdependent
worker productivity (Goldin, 1986; Heywood andWei, 1997). Insofar as
this is linked to lowerworkplace effort (Heywoodand Jirjahn, 2004) and
less responsiveness of effort to group incentives, thismay lead to greater
supervisorypressureonwomen in aprofit sharingenvironment. In turn,
thismakeswomenmore likely to report that profit sharing reduces their
satisfaction with the supervisor. This influence may be exacerbated
further for women who have dependent children. These workers may
be particularly less able to respond to pressure because they have even
greater home responsibilities. While we confirm the anticipated
difference by gender, we do not find differences based on children.
The role of union membership in determining job satisfaction has
been extensively researched (Clark, 1996; Bender and Sloane, 1998,
Bryson et al., 2004)withmost studiesfinding a negative correlation and
debate ensuring over whether it reflects causation or sorting. We
confirm the negative partial correlation with satisfaction with the
supervisor but aremore interested in its interaction with profit sharing.
Several threads of theory suggest that the relationship of union
members to their supervisor may not respond to profit sharing in the
same fashion as does that of non-union members. First, worker
organisationsmay be instrumental in creating a successful profit sharing
scheme that is believed in byworkers (Heywood and Jirjahn, 2007). The
access of the union to information and the ability of the union to enforce
terms may generate a scheme less subject to managerial moral hazard
(Chisholm, 1997). Moreover, the ability of workers to negotiate the
terms of the schememay also increase satisfactionwith the scheme and
the incentives that flow from it. Marsden and Belfield (2004) identify a
strong role for unions in enforcing and modifying the terms of
performance pay schemes arguing they take on a “procedural justice
role.” Second, unions may limit the extent to which supervisors can
pressureworkers and change theability or incentive ofworkers to report
shirking to supervisors. The more formalized work rules and grievance
process of the union setting imply that relations with the supervisor
need not be worsened by the introduction of profit sharing. Third, the
unionmay be instrumental in generating theworkplace norms andpeer
pressure changing the focus away from the supervisor. This fits with the
survey evidence of Freeman et al. (2010) that the nature of manage-
ment–employee relations is critical in determining the extent of mutual
monitoring.While not exhaustive, each of these threads hints that profit
sharing may alter relations with supervisors differently in union and
non-union settings.
Indeed, we find that among non-union workers profit sharing is
associatedwithworsening satisfactionwith the supervisorwhile among
union workers it is associated with improved satisfaction with the
supervisor. We use this result to speculate about differences between
relations found in the UK data and that from Germany.
3. Data and methodology
The data in this paper are drawn from the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS), which has run from 1991 onwards. The BHPS is a
nationally representative sample that each year interviews
Table 1
Satisfaction by payment type.









Profit share/Bonus 5.333 [1.363] 5.459 [1.539] 4.690 [1.637] 5.091 [1.523]
No profit
share/Bonus
5.392 [1.438] 5.581 [1.539] 4.534 [1.771] 5.237 [1.571]
Observations 20,983
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Great Britain. The BHPS contains a number of variables related to job
satisfaction and we are specifically interested in attitudes towards the
boss. The related variable, how satisfied are you with the boss, is
available only from 1991 to 1997. All job satisfaction questions in the
BHPS are reported on a 7 value Likert scale, 1 being the least satisfied, 7
the most satisfied. We restrict our sample to those working individuals
aged 20 to 65 and exclude the self-employed, public sector workers and
those with missing data (3145 individuals in total are excluded). This
yields an unbalanced panel of 6807 workers.
Over the years the BHPS has contained different information on
payment methods but for 1991–1997 participants were asked the
question “did you receive a profit share or bonus”which we use as our
indicator of profit share receipt. As recognized by others (Booth and
Frank, 1999), for the years 1992–1994 this question was only asked for
individuals who changed jobs. In our empirical analysis we estimate all
models for the complete sample, 1991–1997, assuming that if the
worker did not change jobs their profit sharing status did not change.
While others have made this assumption (Lemieux et al., 2009), we
recognize that it generates an errors-in-variables problem potentially
biasing our estimates toward insignificance. In an alternative approach,
we used only the observations that provide a current year indicator of
profit sharing. This alternative becomes more important if there exist
numerous changes in the use of profit sharing for workers who retain
the same job.4 Importantly, all of our key results remain identical across
these alternative treatments of the data difficulty.
Following past research, the values of satisfactionwith the boss are
fitted to the cumulative normal distribution through ordered probit
estimates (see Clark and Oswald, 1996 and Clark, 1997 among others).
Such ordered probit estimation is designed for dependent variables
with a natural ordering, such as least to most satisfied (see McKelvey
and Zavonia, 1975). At issue is whether or not we identify lower
satisfaction with the boss among workers receiving profit sharing
after accounting for reasonable controls. Among the available controls
are characteristics of the worker (such as gender, education and age)
and characteristics of the job (such as occupation, industry and size of
the workplace). We experiment with various combinations of the
available controls but repeatedly confirm lower satisfaction with the
boss among those receiving profit sharing.
A critical control included in the ordered probit estimates will be the
individual's overall job satisfaction. The specific dimensions of job
satisfaction (such as with the boss) are often seen as components of
overall job satisfaction and, indeed, are frequently used to create an
index of overall job satisfaction (Bryson et al., 2004). Moreover, in the
BHPS the individual dimensions of job satisfaction are known to be
highly correlated with the overall satisfaction measure as reported by
theworkers (Green and Heywood, forthcoming-b). Thus, by controlling
for the overall measure, we focus on the specific role profit sharing plays
on relations with the boss rather than potentially picking up the
correlation between various measures of job satisfaction. In presenting
the results we emphasize this point by comparing the estimates with
and without including overall job satisfaction.
A second methodological concern arises from the potential of non-
randomsorting byworkers into profit sharing jobs. Specifically,workers
naturally dissatisfied with their boss may sort into jobs with profit
sharing arrangements leading to a spurious suggestion that profit
sharing lowers satisfaction with the boss. While the potential
mechanism for such sorting is not obvious, profit sharing could be
associated with more conflict between workers and supervisor and
thoseworkerswho inherently view bosses negativelymay have a lower
psychic cost of working in environments with such conflict. The point is4 Indeed, in his examination of profit sharing in Germany, Jirjahn (2002) found that
between 1994 and 1996 more establishments either added or dropped profit sharing
than retained it over the two-year period. In our results, we will present evidence on
how often profit sharing status changes for those on the same job.not that we can test this specific mechanism, but that non-random
sorting raises the possibility that profit sharing has no influence on
relations with the boss. Instead, profit sharing might merely attract a
different set of workers who would have lower satisfaction with their
boss regardless of the presence of profit sharing. We investigate this
general possibility of non-random sorting by re-estimating individual
fixed effects ordered probit versions of the models. These estimates
follow from a routine dedicated to this purpose in Limdep 8.0.5 The
estimates are based on the changes in satisfaction with the boss
measured on those individualworkers switching between regimeswith
and without profit sharing.
Moreover, we will examine whether or not the pattern of results
supports differences by demographic groups that may be more or less
able to respond to peer and employer pressure. We will examine
differences by gender and differences by unionization.
Table A1 presents summary statistics split by whether the worker
receives profit sharing or not. Briefly, women are less likely to be
employed under profit sharing arrangements, as are workers with
dependent children. Workers under profit sharing relationships, on
average, work longer hours, both in terms of normal hours and
overtime. They also have higher average education levels and are less
likely to have poor/fair health.
Table 1 provides preliminary evidence of a link between profit shares
and attitudes to the boss. It reports sample means for satisfaction with
the boss split according towhether theworker received a profit share or
not. For the purposes of comparison we also report overall job
satisfaction, as well as the two other dimensions available in the BHPS
for this period, satisfaction with pay and satisfaction with hours.
Workers on profit shares report a significantly (at 1%) lower average
satisfaction with the boss than other workers. In terms of more general
differences, there is no statistically significant difference in average
overall job satisfaction between profit shareworkers and otherworkers.
Workers on profit sharing do report significantly (at 1%) higher
satisfaction with pay and lower satisfaction with hours.
We note several related data issues before turning to the results.
First, the available profit sharing measure is dichotomous indicating
only whether or not the worker received such payments. The survey
provides no indication of howmanyworkers in the workplace received
profit sharing or of the share of worker compensation comprised by the
resulting payments. While general surveys of individual workers often
share this limitation, they do allow the tracking of specific workers over
time. Second, the profit sharing variable identifies workers who have
received profit sharing rather than those who participate in a scheme.
The latter is potentially important as evenwhen the schemedoesn't pay
out itmay stillmotivateworkersmaking interpretation tricky. Third, the
question appears to leave open the inclusion of other types of
performance pay. While we anticipate that it captures all instances of
profit sharing, the “bonus” mentioned might not necessarily be related
to profit. In later years of the BHPS (1998 onwards) a second question is
introduced explicitly separating out performance pay and also in those
later years the profit sharing question identifies “profit related pay or
profit sharing bonus.” This might be a superior question but5 The Limdep routine is “fixed effects ordered choice models, E.18.5.1” and its
advantages and limitations are discussed in Greene (2001).
Table 2
Profit sharing and satisfaction with the boss. BHPS 1991–97, private sector employees
20–65 years old.
(I) (II) (III) (IV) Marginal effects
(most satisfied)
Profit share/Bonus −0.046** −0.046** −0.041** −0.064* −0.021*
[0.020] [0.020] [0.021] [0.021] [0.007]
Male −0.201* −0.166* −0.128* −0.048*** −0.016***
[0.025] [0.027] [0.029] [0.028] [0.009]
Age −0.045* −0.045* −0.042* −0.023* −0.008*
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.002]
Age2 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0006* 0.0004* 0.0001*
[0.00009] [0.00009] [0.00008] [0.00009] [0.00003]
Married 0.040*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.016 0.005
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.023] [0.008]
Dependent child 0.217* 0.204* 0.141* 0.076** 0.025**
[0.035] [0.035] [0.036] [0.035] [0.012]
A Level −0.044 −0.061** −0.062** 0.011 0.003
[0.029] [0.030] [0.031] [0.029] [0.009]
Diploma −0.054 −0.090** −0.083*** −0.021 −0.007
[0.043] [0.044] [0.044] [0.041] [0.013]
Degree or higher −0.064** −0.108* −0.113* 0.006 0.002
[0.032] [0.038] [0.038] [0.037] [0.012]
Tenure −0.004* −0.004* −0.005* −0.002*
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.0004]
Normal hours −0.006* −0.0015 −0.0004
[0.001] [0.001] [0.0004]
Overtime hours −0.002 −0.004* −0.001*
[0.002] [0.002] [0.0005]
Foreman/Supervisor 0.039 −0.011 −0.004
[0.026] [0.025] [0.008]
Manager 0.071** −0.006 −0.002
[0.035] [0.033] [0.011]
Large firm −0.160* −0.131* −0.042*
[0.022] [0.021] [0.007]
Job satisfaction 0.435* 0.142*
[0.008] [0.003]
Regional controls √ √ √ √ √
Industry controls √ √ √ √
Occupation controls √ √ √ √
Pseudo r2 0.012 0.015 0.019 0.105
Observations 20,983 20,983 20,983 20,983
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Models I–III include
controls for year. Results are ordered probit average effects.
Table 4
Profit shares and alternative measures. BHPS 1991–1997, private sector employees 20–
65 years old.






Profit share/Bonus −0.087* 0.058* 0.010
[0.018] [0.022] [0.021]
Regional controls √ √ √
Industry controls √ √ √
Occupation controls √ √ √
Pseudo r2 0.086 0.034 0.029
Observations 2973 20,792 20,792
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All controls as per model
IV in Table 2. Results for getting along with the boss are probit marginal effects, all
others are ordered probit average effects.
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satisfaction with the supervisor. Thus, we recognize the ambiguity and
that it introduces an errors-in-variable problem of unknown dimen-
sions requiring caution in interpretation. Fourth, we recognize that
profit sharing is often seen as part of a bundle of HRM practices that are
simultaneously introduced. This bundle may include other incentives
and organizational strategies designed to elicit effort and commitment.
As an individual based survey, the BHPS contains no information on the
use of teams, worker involvement or high performance workplaces.Table 3









Profit share/Bonus 0.013 0.004 0.081**
[0.022] [0.021] [0.022]
Regional controls √ √ √
Industry controls √ √ √
Occupation controls √ √ √
Pseudo r2 0.026 0.036 0.015
Observations 20,983
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All controls as per model
III in Table 2.These dimensions of the workplace necessarily remain outside our
analysis but may influence relations with the boss.
4. Results
Table 2 provides estimates of the association between profit sharing
arrangements and satisfaction with the boss. We start with a
parsimonious specification and add a growing series of additional
controls.
The first (I) specification includes controls for basic personal
characteristics. As shown,men are less satisfiedwith their boss perhaps
reflecting the general tendency for women to be more satisfied with
most aspects of employment (see Clark, 1997). Age appears to have the
U-shape identified in many job satisfaction studies (Clark et al., 1996)
andmarital status is generally a positive determinantwhile education is
a negative determinant; both are common results in general studies of
job satisfaction (Clark and Oswald, 1996). Of central importance, profit
sharing is associatedwith a statistically significant negative reduction in
satisfaction with the boss.6
The second specification (II) addsyears of completed tenurewith the
employer to the other controls. It also adds controls for occupation and
industry. Tenure emerges as negative, suggesting that additional tenure
is associatedwith reduced satisfactionwith theboss.Weemphasize that
years of tenure might also be anticipated to reflect the satisfaction of
workers as the dissatisfiedwill tend to leave their current employment.
Yet, despite this concern, the inclusion of the tenure variable does not
alter the role played by profit sharing and, indeed, adding or subtracting
tenure from any of our estimations proves completely immaterial. The
inclusion of occupation and industry controls also does not affect the
relationship between profit sharing and satisfaction with the boss.
The third specification (III) retains all the previous controls and
adds those for hours of work, whether the worker is a supervisor or
is a manager and the size of the workplace in which the worker is
employed. The results suggest that longer hours are associated with
lower satisfaction with the boss while managers are more satisfied
with their boss. Workers in larger establishments (100 workers or
more) report lower satisfaction with the boss.7 It might be thought
that higher pay under profit sharing compensates for poorer
relations with supervisors yet in unreported estimates that add
worker's pay to specification (III), the negative relationship
between profit sharing and satisfaction with the boss remained.6 All of our estimates use robust standard errors as we are concerned about the
clustering of several observations per worker. In addition, depending on the survey
design, explicit use of sample weights in the regression may make a material
difference (Magee et al., 1998). Using the cross-sectional weights given by the BHPS,
we found no such difference and that the estimates repeated the patterns of
significance shown in Table 2.
7 This large workplace dummy comes from identifying those in the two largest
categories given by the BHPS. Introducing a full set of dummies to capture all
categories does not change the role of profit sharing.
Table 6
Profit shares and satisfaction with the boss, gender and unions. BHPS 1991–1997,
private sector employees 20–65 years old.
Male Female Union Non-union
Pooled models
Profit share/Bonus −0.036 −0.094* 0.049** −0.062*
[0.028] [0.031] [0.044] [0.021]
Regional controls √ √ √ √
Industry controls √ √ √ √
Occupation controls √ √ √ √
Pseudo r2 0.095 0.111 0.094 0.107
Fixed effects models
Profit share/Bonus −0.021 −0.116** 0.105** −0.054*
[0.038] [0.052] [0.050] [0.026]
Regional controls √ √ √ √
Industry controls √ √ √ √
Occupation controls √ √ √ √
Pseudo r2 0.333 0.354 0.212 0.295
Observations 11,294 9689 2983 18,000
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All controls as per model
IV in Table 2.
Table 5







Profit share/Bonus −0.059** −0.100* 0.040**
[0.029] [0.035] [0.018]
Regional controls √ √ √
Industry controls √ √ √
Occupation controls √ √ √
Pseudo r2 0.345 0.268 0.398
Observations 20,983 9011 20,792
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All controls as per model
III in Table 2.
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significance associated with profit sharing barely moves. Hence,
there is initial evidence of a negative relationship between profit
shares and satisfaction with the boss that is not explained by
standard personal and workplace characteristics.
In the fourth specification (IV) we retain all the previous controls
but add the measure of overall job satisfaction. As anticipated, it
emerges as a highly significant and positive partial correlate of
satisfaction with the supervisor. In including this measure we
recognize that the various measures of job satisfaction tend to move
together. Thus, overall satisfaction could be an omitted correlated
variable leaving us unable to isolate the specific relationship between
profit sharing and satisfaction with the supervisor. There is support
for this general type of concern when examining some of the control
variables. Thus, managers and supervisors are known to have higher
overall job satisfaction (Clark, 1996) and our earlier results suggested
that they had higher satisfaction with their boss. This suggestion is no
longer evident as the coefficient for managers becomes insignificant
after controlling for overall satisfaction.8 Nonetheless, the general
tenor of the control variables remains and, most critically, the role of
profit sharing remains. Indeed, if anything the size and significance of
the profit sharing coefficient has increased. Holding constant the
overall satisfaction with the job, those workers receiving profit
sharing report lower satisfaction with their boss.9
Themagnitude of this effect is shown in column 4 which reports the
marginal effects from model IV. Specifically, the marginal effects are
those associated with the probability of being in the most satisfied
category of relations with the boss. They suggest that those on profit
sharing are 2 percentage points less likely to be in this category. As the
overall sample probability of being in this category is 30.3%, this is a non-
trivial decline.
We have emphasized that the estimates of profit sharing's
negative effect on satisfaction with the boss do not merely reflect
an effect on overall job satisfaction. To demonstrate this in an
alternative fashion we re-estimate the specification in Column 3 of
Table 2 with overall job satisfaction as the dependent variable.
Estimates, reported in column 1 of Table 3, suggest that there is no8 Recognizing that supervisors and foreman are higher in the firm hierarchy, we
estimated the specification on a subsample of just these workers. Despite the smaller
sample size, the coefficient is −.060 with a standard error of .032. Including an
interaction of profit sharing with this occupational group in the full sample
specification returns an insignificant coefficient suggesting that their reaction to
profit sharing is not different from that of others workers.
9 Another potential concern is that workers in specific occupations may tend to both
receive profit sharing and have better relations with the boss. As a robustness check,
we replaced the broad occupational dummies in model IV with 354 disaggregated 3-
digit occupational dummies. Despite the addition of these controls, the role of profit
sharing remains strongly evident with a coefficient of −.070 and a standard error of
.021.relationship between profit sharing and overall job satisfaction.10
Table 3 also reports analogous estimates of the relationship between
profit sharing and satisfaction with hours, and satisfaction with pay,
respectively. Again there is no evidence of a relationship between
profit shares and satisfaction with working hours. There is, however,
evidence that profit sharing is associated with higher satisfaction
with pay.11 This, when coupled with the negative impact of profit
shares on satisfaction with the boss, highlights the potential for a
trade-off between higher productivity (and hence improved pay)
and increased supervisory pressure under profit sharing. Thus, it
seems consistent that profit sharing brings additional peer and
supervisory monitoring that increases productivity and earnings but
which reduces the quality of relations with the supervisor.
We obviously see this evidence as somewhat at odds with the US
evidence from Kruse et al. (2010) that workers in “shared capitalism”
are more likely to see their boss as caring and helpful and less likely to
report being closely supervised. We note that these US results emerge
more strongly when focusing on employee ownership and less strongly
when focusing on profit sharing. We also note the large differences in
scope between our broad measure of job satisfaction with the boss and
themore detailed aspects examined in the US surveys. Nonetheless, the
markeddifferences suggest theneed to breakdownour results to search
for patterns that couldbe consistentwitha role for supervisorypressure.
In short, supervisory pressuremay not be applied equally to all workers.
We further investigate the negative association between profit
sharing and relations with the boss by using information on what
workers consider themost important aspects of a job and by examining
strain and overall well-being. The first wave of the BHPS (1991) records
what workers consider the first and second most important aspect of a
job. Possible responses include pay, promotion prospects, job security,
the actual work itself, use of initiative or hours worked. Another
category of response is “good relations with the manager”. We use this
response to create a binary variable taking the value of unity if the
individual responded that good relationswith themanager is among the
first or second most important aspect of a job. This becomes an10 Using later BHPS waves, Green and Heywood (2008) report a positive relationship
between profit sharing and overall job satisfaction while Artz (2008) shows an
insignificant relationship using “Working in Britain in the Year 2000” survey.
Differences in the questionnaire prohibit an exact replication of the Green and
Heywood (2008) specification using these earlier data while the later BHPS years do
not include the question on satisfaction with the boss.
11 Importantly the relationship between profit sharing and satisfaction with pay
remains even after controlling for workers actual pay, although the magnitude of the
coefficient diminishes slightly, 0.053 [0.023].
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(IV) in Table 2. Our thinking is merely that workers who value this
characteristic less should sort into circumstances in which relations are
worse. Marginal effects from probit estimation of this equation are
reported in column 1 of Table 4. These demonstrate that workers under
profit shares are 8percentagepoints less likely to list good relationswith
the manager as an important aspect of the job. While we will return
explicitly to issues of sorting, at this stage we merely take the result as
suggestive that workers who do not value the quality of relations with
the boss work disproportionately in circumstances with profit sharing.
The BHPS contains a range of questions on respondent well-being of
which we focus on the two most relevant for our investigation: the
extent to which the respondent feels constant strain and the worker's
overall happiness. Both are Likert Scale measures (1 to 4), the former
indicates pressure in life of the sort thatmight come from, among other
things, the pressure to produce at work, while the latter measures very
general well-being. We estimate two ordered probit models with these
as dependent variables following the specifications used in the earlier
model IV of Table 2. As shown in column 2 of Table 4, profit sharing is
associated with a significantly greater likelihood of workers feeling
under constant strain, indicative of increased working pressure as a
result of profit sharing.12 On the other hand, there is no evidence of a
statistical relationship between profit sharing and overall well-being, or
even in unreported estimates, other negativewell-being outcomes such
as depression or loss of sleep.Whilewe are circumspect inwhatwe take
from Table 4 we suggest that it is indicative of profit sharing being
associated with greater monitoring pressure but not with reduced
overall life satisfaction.
To this point all estimates have been from pooled models. As
emphasized earlier, these may ignore the non-random sorting of
workers into profit sharing jobs. Specifically, it could be that workers
with a greater likelihood of being dissatisfied with their boss may sort
into jobs with profit sharing arrangements. We investigate this
possibility by re-estimating a fixed effect ordered probit version of
model IV reported in Table 2.13 The resulting estimate of profit sharing's
effect on satisfaction with the boss is reported in Table 5. The point
estimate remains of the same general magnitude as those reported in
Table 2 and it remains statistically significant. In this estimate the
identification comes from those who switch profit sharing status. Thus,
the coefficients measure the change in satisfaction for individual
workers as they move into and out of profit sharing regimes thus
holding constant any inherent individual differences in the likelihood to
report better or worse relations with the boss.14
The second column examines the sample from 1995 to 1997 in
which the question about profit sharing is asked each year regardless of
whether or not the worker changed jobs. The strong role for profit
sharing remains. Moreover, this effect is substantially more negative
than that for the full sample. This suggests that these full sample
estimates of profit sharing on satisfactionwith the bossmay suffer from
measurement error.We also investigatewhether or not the influence of
profit sharing on strain is robust to the inclusion of controls for worker
fixed effects. This effect, when compared to that reported in Table 4,
remains positive, statistically significant and of the same general
magnitude.1512 Again, one might think that wages would adjust to compensate for any higher
strain (stress) associated with profit sharing jobs. However, including controls for
workers pay has essentially no effect on the estimated relationship between profit
shares and strain.
13 These estimates follow from a routine dedicated to this purpose in Limdep 8.0 and
the full results are available from the authors upon request.
14 We note again that leaving a profit sharing regime may be caused either by a
worker no longer being in a profit sharing regime or by a regime simply paying out
nothing in a particular year.
15 In unreported estimates the effect of profit sharing on overall happiness remains
unchanged once controls for fixed effects are included.To this point we have demonstrated a negative relationship
between profit sharing and satisfaction with the supervisor that is
robust to controlling for overall job satisfaction and for worker fixed
effects and which does not appear to carry over to satisfaction with
other aspects of the job. This seems congruent with the results on
strain and other measures of well-being. We recognize that it still
remains possible that moving between profit sharing regimes could
be endogenous. Unmeasured factors correlated with changing profit
sharing regimes could also correlate with changes in satisfaction
with the boss. Yet, given the apparent negative influence of profit
sharing on satisfaction with the boss, the easiest stories of such
selection seem less plausible. Had we found that workers in profit
sharing were more satisfied with their boss, one might anticipate
that unmeasured factors influenced them to select into workplaces
with profit sharing in order to capture the utility gain.
We also emphasize that there exist a large number of status changes
upon which to base the fixed effect estimates (2525). These status
changes mainly occur through changes in profit share status within the
same job: 2006 episodes within the same job as opposed to 519
occurrences of workers changing profit sharing status through changing
job. As a test we divided the sample into those workers who didn't
change status and thosewhodid. The two resulting estimates of ourfinal
estimate in Table 2 both reveal a negative cross-sectional relationship
between profit sharing and satisfactionwith theboss,−0.055 [0.027] for
changers and −0.094 [0.031] for non-changers. Thus, the effect across
the samples of changers and non-changers seem broadly similar.
Moreover, even among the changers, we could not detect meaningful
differences with separate estimates for those workers who changed
profit sharing status within and across job both revealing a negative
effect of profit sharing on job satisfaction. Finally, we examined potential
differences in thefixed effect estimates comparingwithin job and across
job changes in profit sharing regimes for 1995–1997 (the only period
whenwe observe both). We included a new variable that switches from
zero to onewhen changing jobs results in newly receivingprofit sharing.
Similarly, it switches for one to zerowhen changing jobs results in newly
losing profit sharing. The coefficient on this new variable emerges near
zero and not statistically significant while the coefficient on the original
profit sharing variable remains largely unchanged. Thus, while we
cannot rule out influential omitted variables in thefixed effect estimates,
we are hard pressed to imagine what they would be and remain
reasonably confident in the apparently robust relationship between
profit sharing and lower satisfaction with the boss.
We now examine variations across sub-groups to explore whether
anticipated variations in supervisory pressure are reflected indifferences
in our fundamental relationship. We begin by dividing the sample by
gender as shown in Table 6. The initial pooled estimates suggest that
profit sharing has a more profound negative influence on satisfaction
with the supervisor for women than for men. The male coefficient is
substantially smaller and very far from significance. The female
coefficient is large and easily passes conventional tests of statistical
significance. Themarginal effect of being in themost satisfied category is
only one-half of one percentage point for males (−.005) while the
marginal effect forwomen isnearly three andone-half percentagepoints
(−.034). Controlling for worker fixed effects does little to alter the
insignificant negative influence for men but causes the female estimate
to increase in both size and precision. These estimations by gender
strongly suggest it is women who are largely responsible for the overall
results reported earlier that profit sharing is associated with reduced
satisfaction with the supervisor. To the extent that women have greater
non-market responsibilities, this would be consistent with a reduced
ability to increase effort in response to supervisory pressure and the
resulting deteriorating in relations with the boss. This finding of
substantial gender differences replicates findings using a German
cross-section that men's relationships with their boss and with co-
workers fare better under profit sharing then do those of women
(Heywood et al., 2005a,b). In addition, it could be consistent with recent
866 C.P. Green, J.S. Heywood / Labour Economics 17 (2010) 859–867evidence that women respond with less effort and productivity to
circumstances of pressure and competition (Gneezy et al., 2003)
perhaps, in part, because of different preferences over the implied
conflict (Croson andGreezny, 2009). Nonetheless, it remains remarkable
how large the influence is for women and that a significant influence
cannot be confirmed for men.
The estimates separated by union status are perhaps even more
dramatic. They conform to the logic suggested earlier in the paper. The
influence of profit sharing on relations with the supervisor is very large
and highly significant for the non-union members who make up the
bulk of the sample. Yet, among the union members, the presence of
profit sharing is associated with improved relations with the boss. The
marginal effect of being in the most satisfied category is−.019 for non-
union members and is +.030 for union members. This stark contrast
exists in both the pooled estimates and the worker fixed effect
estimates. It is suggestive that unions change the relationship with the
boss sufficiently that the introduction of profit sharing generates a
different reaction. Union members start from a base of more conflict
(worse relationswith theboss) butmay see theprofit sharing schemeas
an explicit way to capture mutual gains and have sufficient faith in the
scheme, perhaps because of the role of the union, to have it improve
relations with the boss. Related to this, it may be that the mutual
monitoring that adds stress to workers in general (non-union workers)
is less prevalent in unions. Itmaybe that the formalized structures of the
union environment do not allow or reward the reporting of shirking to
superiors. Alternatively it may be that such shirking is less likely in the
first place or that supervisors cannot control it. While we cannot
pinpoint the exact path of causation, the difference between union and
non-union members is dramatic and in the direction largely expected
from previous theory and evidence.
5. Conclusion
The method through which profit sharing influences productivity
and effort remains in doubt. Two broad strands of not-mutually
exclusive thought emphasize that the direct incentive effect is low but
that profit sharing changes relationships among workers and between
workers and the firm. Profit sharing may increase cooperation and
helping effort. It may also increase monitoring and pressure. We have
emphasized that much of either influence will flow through the
supervisor. As a consequence, the way in which profit sharing changes
relations between workers and supervisor helps identify which
influence may be predominant.
Our initial evidence shows that those on profit sharing in the UK
report lower satisfactionwith their boss. This is corroboratedbyfindings
that they also report good relationswith the boss as a less important job
characteristic and that they report greater strain associated with profit
sharing. Nonetheless, these findings are not a general reflection of
workers on profit sharing reporting lower levels of overall satisfaction.
This set of findings hints that it maywell be the role of monitoring from
the boss thatworkers perceiving negatively changing as a result of profit
sharing. Importantly, there appear to be specific groups of workers that
generate much of the overall finding. Women and non-unionized
workers tend to generate the association of profit sharing with a lower
level of satisfactionwith the boss.We have suggested these groupsmay
be those for whom supervisory pressure can less easily be translated
into greater effort (and/or are thosemore subject to such pressure) and
who may, therefore, have greater resentment toward their supervisor.
We recognize that neither profit sharing nor the existing workforce
exogenously appear in aworkplace. It is possible thatworker selectionor
firm selection may be generating our results. While our individual data
sourceprovidesus fewreasonable instruments,weemphasizeagain that
our core results are not of the sort that typically generates selection
concerns. Moreover, our fixed effect estimates are based on a large
sample of status changers and those changers do not look substantively
different from the non-changers. Nonetheless, we highlight thatselection stands as a reasonable future research topic especially for
those using matched employee–employer data that is likely to provide
stronger identification.
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Appendix A
Table A1
Sample statistics 1991–1997, private sector employees 20–65 years old.
Source: BHPS, standard deviations in parentheses.No profit share Profit shareMale 0.494 [0.500] 0.616 [0.486]
Age 37.920 [11.501] 36.549 [10.778]
Married 0.618 [0.486] 0.619 [0.485]
Dependent child 0.162 [0.368] 0.095 [0.291]
bA level 0.682 [0.466] 0.596 [0.491]
A level 0.171 [0.379] 0.213 [0.414]
Diploma 0.056 [0.229] 0.067 [0.249]
Degree or higher 0.094 [0.284] 0.132 [0.323]
Tenure (years) 10.636 [7.105] 10.890 [7.053]
Normal hours 33.742 [11.537] 37.173 [8.589]
Overtime hours 3.836 [6.506] 4.932 [6.809]
Foreman/Supervisor 0.165 [0.372] 0.163 [0.374]
Manager 0.157 [0.464] 0.276 [0.493]
Large firm 0.357 [0.322] 0.467 [0.499]
Union member 0.118 [0.322] 0.184 [0.388]
Observations 13,269 7714References
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